

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Revision of DCID 1/11

FROM:

CIA Member, DCI Security Committee
4E-60, Hdqs.

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. ES/DCI SECOM
3D-39, Hdqs.

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20 NOV 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
DCI Security Committee

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1
CIA Member, DCI Security Committee

SUBJECT: Revision of DCID 1/11 [REDACTED] 25X1

REFERENCE: Memorandum from Chairman, DCI Security
Committee, dated 19 October 1979,
same subject (SECOM-D-693)

1. The 19 October 1979 draft revision of DCID 1/11 has been reviewed and still poses some problems for the Central Intelligence Agency. As written, the draft revision continues to assign to the DCI Security Committee the function of formulating policy (unspecified) to govern intelligence dissemination. It also charges SECOM to develop compartmentation guidance (not further specified, our earlier objections notwithstanding) relative to DCI control of intelligence dissemination, sanitization and release procedures. However, these areas of information control are felt to be more appropriately assigned to others closer to intelligence processing and production, who are in a better position to gauge relative sensitivities and the specific protection these should receive. We, therefore, recommend further revisions to make it clear that SECOM's contribution to the broad-based effort to keep safe our intelligence resources is its expertise in the control of access, transmission and storage. [REDACTED] 25X1

2. Specifically, the CIA recommends the following changes:

a. Paragraph 2.b. of the draft DCID charges SECOM "to review, formulate and recommend to the DCI policies, standards and procedures for Intelligence Community application governing the dissemination of intelligence . . ." We believe that this formulation is much more sweeping than the Committee intends inasmuch as decisions regarding dissemination [REDACTED] 25X1

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are first and foremost an originator responsibility. We, therefore, recommend adding the word "security" to modify either: (1) the word "dissemination" (i.e., ". . . application governing the security of the dissemination of . . ."); or (2) the entire series of actions covered by the paragraph:

"To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI security policies, standards and procedures for Intelligence Community application regarding intelligence dissemination generally, release and disclosure to foreigners, and release to the public."

(Note: Underlining in the above paragraph is for emphasis.)

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b. Similar language in Attachment 3, "Compartmentation," paragraph 1.c., would have the SECOM develop and recommend to the DCI guidance on "the establishment, maintenance and improvement of coordinated compartmentation systems which will: . . . ensure control by the DCI of . . . procedures for dissemination, sanitization or release of intelligence." While it is true that SECOM plays a significant role in compartmentation as it involves certain areas of security policy and practice, the Committee is not deeply involved in the compartmentation control functions of dissemination, sanitization and release, which are primarily processor and producer responsibilities. We, therefore, reiterate that a modifier--if not "technical" then "security"--should be inserted before the words "guidance" and "procedures." where these words appear in the passages quoted above.

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